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Note
Defining Unpatented Article: Why Labeling
Products with Expired Patent Numbers Should
Not Be False Marking
Laura N. Arneson∗
Many of the products and packages that we use every day
are marked with a patent number: shampoo bottles, tools, cigarette lighters, coffee cup lids, pharmaceuticals, even food.1 Recently, many lawsuits have been filed asserting that products
such as these are falsely marked because the patent referred to
is expired.2 In each of these cases, the plaintiff seeks a large
award, in the millions or billions of dollars.3
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2001,
St. Olaf College; Ph.D., 2007, Mayo Graduate School. Thank you to Professor
Thomas Cotter, Thomas Spielbauer, and Bonnie Nestor for invaluable advice
and editing. My sincere appreciation also belongs to the Editors and Staff of
the Minnesota Law Review, especially Joe Hansen and Jeremy Harrell. Copyright © 2010 by Laura N. Arneson.
1. E.g., High Performance Color-Depositing Shampoo, U.S. Patent No.
6,500,413 (filed Apr. 12, 2000); Liquid Gas-Operated Lighter, Particularly
Pocket Lighter, U.S. Patent No. 4,496,309 (filed Mar. 18, 1992); Oral Sustained Release Acetaminophen Formulation and Process, U.S. Patent No.
4,968,509 (filed Jan. 19, 1989); Lid for Drinking Cup, U.S. Patent No.
4,589,569 (filed Aug. 22, 1984); Calorie-Free Sweetener Without Sourness,
U.S. Patent No. 3,946,121 (filed Aug. 8, 1974).
2. See, e.g., Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (E.D. Va.
2009), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d, Nos.
2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010);
Amended Verified Complaint at 5, Brinkmeier v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc.,
684 F. Supp. 2d 548 (D. Del 2010) (No. 09-cv-00262-JJF), 2010 WL 2519463;
Verified Complaint at 3–4, Brinkmeier v. BIC Corp., No. 09-cv-00860-SLR (D.
Del. Nov. 13, 2009), 2009 WL 4899522; Complaint for False Patent Marking at
9, Pub. Patent Found., Inc. v. McNEIL-PPC, Inc., No. 09-cv-05471 (S.D.N.Y.
June 15, 2009), 2009 WL 5000584 [hereinafter McNEIL Complaint]; Complaint for False Patent Marking at 4, Pub. Patent Found., Inc. v. Cumberland
Packing Corp., No. 09-cv-04360-MGC (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2009), 2009 WL
3121111 [hereinafter Cumberland Complaint]; see also Dionne Searcey, New
Breed of Patent Claim Bedevils Product Makers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2010, at
A1; McDonnell, Boehnen, Hulbert & Berghoff, LLP, Cases: District Court,
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The “false marking statute,” § 292(a) of the Patent Act,
states, in part, “Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in
advertising in connection with any unpatented article, the word
‘patent’ or any word or number importing that the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the public . . . [s]hall be fined
not more than $500 for every such offense.”4 In many of the recent false marking cases, the plaintiffs are not asserting any
individual harm; rather, they are taking advantage of a qui
tam provision in the false marking statute that allows any person—even one uninjured by the violation—to sue and collect a
proportion of the penalty.5 If the plaintiff is successful, one-half
of the award goes to the person suing and the other half to the
United States.6
Traditionally, cases brought under the false marking statute asserted that the product marked with a patent number
was never covered by the claims of the patent.7 However, more
FALSE PATENT MARKING, http://www.falsemarking.net/district.php (last visited Nov. 08, 2010) (compiling a list of the false marking cases currently filed).
3. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Solo Cup Company’s Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 2,
Solo Cup, 646 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 07-cv-00897) [hereinafter Solo Cup Motion
to Dismiss] (noting that plaintiff ’s demands for $500 per article amounted to a
claim for more than $100 billion); see also Matthew Barakat, Legal Quirk Lets
Anyone Sue over Old Patents, DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), June 16,
2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 11621736 (discussing a federal court ruling that allows a person to sue on behalf of the government if they have evidence that a company is guilty of false marking).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006).
5. Id. § 292(b) (“Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event onehalf shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States.”).
6. Id. The award for false marking is up to $500 per offense. Id. § 292(a).
7. Of the thirteen circuit court cases that have been decided, only three
involved the issue of marking with expired patents: Arcadia and the two most
recent decisions, Solo Cup and Stauffer. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., Nos.
2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419, at *3–6 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
31, 2010) (concluding that Stauffer had standing to sue for false marking); Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that Solo Cup had falsely marked its products by labeling them with expired patent
numbers, but lacked the intent to deceive required for liability); Forest Group,
Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that Forest
Group’s marking of stilts after the district court had construed the patents not
to cover the stilts was false marking); Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp.,
406 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (examining whether there was false
marking because Invitrogen marked products with multiple patent numbers
when not every patent applied to the product); Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware
Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that accidental marking with an
inapplicable patent number does not constitute false marking); Arcadia Mach.
& Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding no false marking because the errors in labeling were “inadvertent, the re-
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recently, noncompetitor plaintiffs have begun bringing cases for
violation of the false marking statute against patentees that
mark products with the number of a patent that has expired,
even though the marked product is covered by the claims of the
patent.8 A number of recent Federal Circuit decisions have encouraged plaintiffs to bring this type of case.
In the past year, the Federal Circuit greatly increased the
potential payoff for plaintiffs bringing false marking claims. In
2009, the court held that each article marked constitutes an
“offense” for which a patentee may be fined up to $500.9 By rejecting the interpretation of several district courts that an “offense” meant a decision to mark,10 the court greatly increased
the incentive for plaintiffs to bring suits alleging false marking.
Then, in 2010, the Federal Circuit held that, for the purposes of
the false marking statute, an article covered by the claims of a
patent becomes an “unpatented article” when the patent expires.11 Moreover, the Federal Circuit also held that virtually
any consumer has the right to bring an action against a manufacturer for false marking.12 These decisions have resulted in
sult of oversight, or caused by patent expirations”); Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1360 (9th Cir. 1980) (remanding to the district court to
determine if the defendants had an intent to deceive the public); Brose v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 769 (5th Cir. 1972) (determining whether
there had been mismarking when the marked article was not covered by the
cited patent); Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351, 1354
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (finding that Spell-Right had continued to mark its product as
patented even though it was no longer using the patented process to make the
product); Santa Anita Mfg. Corp. v. Lugash, 369 F.2d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 1966)
(holding that there was no false marking even though some products were
marked with two patent numbers when only one applied); G. Leblanc Corp. v.
H. & A. Selmer, Inc., 310 F.2d 449, 460 (7th Cir. 1962) (determining whether
the elements of false marking were met when the plaintiff had advertised an
article as patented even though no patents had been filed); Graffius v. Weather-Seal, 165 F.2d 782, 782–83 (6th Cir. 1948) (affirming the district court’s determination that the article was not marked in a way that implied it was patented and that the defendant had not marked with an intent to deceive the
public); London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st Cir. 1910)
(emphasizing that even when an unpatented article is marked as patented an
intent to deceive the public is also required for false marking).
8. E.g., Amended Complaint for False Patent Marking at 8, Solo Cup,
646 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 07-cv-00897), 2007 WL 4885280 (alleging that Solo
had marked billions of plastic cup lids with an expired patent number);
McNEIL Complaint, supra note 2, at 6–9 (alleging that McNEIL falsely marked
Tylenol® by labeling its packaging with expired patent numbers).
9. Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1304.
10. Id. at 1302.
11. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361.
12. Stauffer, 2010 WL 3397419, at *4.
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an onslaught of lawsuits against manufacturers who mark
their products with the numbers of expired patents.13
This Note concludes that, in contrast to the Federal Circuit’s recent holding, a product once covered by a valid patent
that has now expired should not be considered an unpatented
article for the purposes of § 292(a). Excluding products covered
by expired patents from the definition of “unpatented article”
would prevent exploitative litigation and furthers the false
marking statute’s purpose. Part I describes the history of marking, the purposes of the false marking statute, and the courts’
interpretations of the statute. Part II examines the effects on
public policy and litigation of treating a product as an unpatented article after its protecting patent has expired. Part III
proposes that the Federal Circuit should reverse its recent decisions and hold that a product covered by an expired patent
should not be considered an unpatented article under § 292(a).
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT MARKING AND
FALSE MARKING
The patent false marking statute, § 292(a), prevents marking an “unpatented article” with “the word ‘patent’ or any word
or number importing that the same is patented for the purpose
of deceiving the public.”14 The Federal Circuit has recently held
that “unpatented article” should encompass not only articles for
which a patent has never been issued, but also articles that are
covered by the claims of an expired, but once valid, patent.15 In
order to determine if this expanded interpretation of the false
marking statute is consistent with its historical application and
purpose, the following sections detail the history of the false
marking statute, the policy reasons for regulating marking of
patented articles, and the ways in which courts have interpreted the statute in prior litigation.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FALSE MARKING STATUTE
Congress first introduced the false marking statute in
1842, imposing a penalty on any person marking as patented
“any thing . . . [for] which he hath not or shall not have obtained letters patent.”16 The statute also penalized infringers
13.
14.
15.
16.

Searcey, supra note 2, at A1.
35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006).
Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361.
Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544.
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who had not purchased or licensed the article from the patentee, but nevertheless marked their product as patented with the
intent to “counterfeit[]” and with the “purpose of deceiving the
public.”17 Congress revised the false marking statute in 1870
when it updated the Patent Act, again imposing a penalty on
any person who marked as patented anything for which “he has
not obtained a patent” and on persons who marked with the
“intent to imitate or counterfeit.”18 Congress further extended
the penalty to persons who mark “any unpatented article [with]
the word ‘patent,’ or any word importing that the same is patented, for the purpose of deceiving the public.”19 In the most
recent major revision to the Patent Act in 1952, Congress codified the false marking statute as 35 U.S.C. § 292, making it an
“ordinary criminal action.”20 The House Report described the
statute as “relating to falsely marking an article as being patented when it was not patented.”21 In its current form, the statute still applies to those who mark articles without the consent
of the patentee and also to “[w]hoever . . . marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any unpatented
article, the word ‘patent’ or any word or number importing that
the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the public.”22
Initially, Congress used the false marking statute to impose a marking obligation, requiring that every patented article
be marked with the date the patent issued.23 Because the term
of the patent was measured from the time of issue, this meant
that the expiration of the patent was easily discernible from the

17. Id.; see also G. Leblanc Corp. v. H. & A. Selmer, Inc., 310 F.2d 449,
459 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that an intent to deceive the public is a prerequisite to finding a party guilty of false marking). This intent element prevents
the false marking statute from creating strict liability for false marking. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
18. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 39, 16 Stat. 198, 203.
19. Id.
20. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2403. The most current version of the statute includes amendments made
in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, but these changes only
pertained to the location of the use and sale of the article. Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(b)(6), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10. The legislative history on record for the
statute’s incorporation into the 1952 Patent Act is very sparse. Solo Cup Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 9.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006); see also Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352 (refusing
to render the false marking statute a statute of strict liability and maintaining
the “intent to deceive” requirement).
23. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 6, 5 Stat. 543, 544 –45.
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marking information.24 In 1870, Congress eliminated the marking requirement, replacing it with a statute that incentivized
marking by making recovery of damages contingent on marking.25 In its most recent revision in 1952, Congress continued to
provide an incentive to mark by requiring that the article be
marked as patented in order to satisfy the notice requirement
used in calculating damages against infringers.26
When Congress first introduced the false marking statute
in 1842, it imposed a minimum $100 penalty.27 In 1870, it preserved a $100 minimum penalty “for every such offense.”28 In
the most recent major revision to the Patent Act in 1952, the
penalty for false marking was changed to a maximum of $500
“per offense.”29 Due to the inclusion of a qui tam provision in
the statute, half the penalty imposed on the defendant is taken
by the party bringing the action.30
Congress included a qui tam provision when it first
enacted the false marking statute, stipulating that one-half of
any penalty recovered should be paid to “any person or persons
who shall sue.”31 Qui tam is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase
qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,
which translates to “who as well for the king as for himself sues
in this matter.”32 Qui tam, or “informer,” actions allow a private
person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government re24. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 59 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that historically
the term of a U.S. patent was fixed).
25. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 38, 16 Stat. 198, 203 (1870).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). A patent holder can only recover damages for
infringement from the date it began marking the article or gave adequate notice to the infringer that the article was patented. Preston Moore & Jackie
Nakamura, The United States Patent Marking and Notice Statute, 22 AIPLA
Q.J. 85, 90–91 (1994).
27. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5.
28. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 39.
29. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir.
2009). The Federal Circuit’s holding in this case settled a controversy regarding how to define an “offense” for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 292. Forest
Group, 590 F.3d at 1302–03; see also Donald W. Rupert, Trolling for Dollars: A
New Threat to Patent Owners, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Mar. 2009, at 4.
The Federal Circuit decided that Congress meant “per offense” to mean per
article sold, not to refer to each time a decision to mark was made. Forest
Group, 590 F.3d at 1302–03.
30. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 5–6 (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf.
31. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5.
32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
AND
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ceives.33 Today, the false marking statute is one of only three
remaining federal qui tam statutes in the United States.34 Like
other informer statutes, the false marking statute offers rewards “as a matter of public policy to accomplish outlawing of
fraudulent and illegal acts to the public detriment.”35 Historically, the qui tam action has almost always been brought by a
competitor in the context of patent litigation.36 However, the
party bringing the action need not be a victim.37 In qui tam
suits, the United States—not the plaintiff bringing the action—
must have suffered an injury, and the government “is therefore
the real plaintiff in the action.”38
As part of the Patent Act, the false marking statute is governed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.39 The
Federal Circuit applies a four part test to determine if labeling
as patented rises to the level of false marking: (1) that a marking imports that the article is patented, (2) that the marking is
33. DOYLE, supra note 30, at 1.
34. Id. at 4. The other statutes are the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729–3733 (2009), and the Indian Protection Provision of 25 U.S.C. § 201
(2006). See DOYLE, supra note 30, at 5–8, 21–22.
35. Calderwood v. Mansfield, 71 F. Supp. 480, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (refusing to find false marking where metal watch wrist bands were marked with a
design patent number that did not cover the product because plaintiff could
not demonstrate a purpose to deceive the public).
36. Brose v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1972) (“As
is true in nearly all of the relatively few qui tam informer actions brought in
the past one and a quarter century this one is used as a weapon in the arsenal
of patent litigation . . . .”); Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d
1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“That provision is designed to protect the exclusiveness of the use of the invention granted to the patentee. The patentee is
given this remedy to protect his patent position, and as a practical matter, the
patentee is the only likely enforcer of it, as recovery requires proof that the
statements were made without his consent.”).
37. Cf. Christina L. Brown & Taffie N. Jones, Proposed Legislation Under
the Patent Reform Act, MCDONNELL BOEHNEN HULBERT & BERGHOFF LLP’S
FALSE MARKING NOTES & COMMENTS (Mar. 22, 2010), http://falsemarkingmbhb
.typepad.com/mbhbs-false-marking-notes-comments/2010/03/propsed-legislation
-under-the-patent-reform-act.html (describing proposed amendments that
would require a false marking plaintiff to have suffered competitive injury);
R. David Donoghue, Patent Reform Act Has False Marking in Its Sites, CHI. IP
LIT. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.chicagoiplitigation.com/2010/04/articles/
legal-news/patent-reform-act-has-false-marking-in-its-sites/ (same).
38. United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212 (7th
Cir. 1995).
39. Since its establishment in 1982, the Federal Circuit has been solely
responsible for appeals of cases arising under the patent laws. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295 (2000); Brian H. Redmond, Annotation, Jurisdiction of United States
Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1292 and 1295, 97
A.L.R. FED. 694, 713–39 (1990).

2010]

FALSE MARKING

657

falsely affixed to (3) an unpatented article, and (4) that the
marking of the article as patented was done with a purpose of
deceiving the public.40
B. THE POLICIES BEHIND THE REGULATION OF MARKING
Marking articles with a patent number can serve a variety
of purposes for the patentee, the consumer, and the patentee’s
competitors. In regulating marking, Congress and the courts
have sought to balance the costs and benefits of marking to
both the patentee and the public, paralleling the more general
policies of patent protection.41 The main functions of marking
an article with a patent number are to protect the public, to deter mismarking, to provide notice to potential infringers, and to
allow the public to identify a product’s intellectual property status.42
Marking protects “the public against the fraudulent use of
the word patent.”43 Marking an unpatented article as patented
allows the marker to mislead the public44 and enjoy the benefits of patenting, including status recognition and even potential monopoly rights, without providing the corresponding benefits to society.45 Preventing unscrupulous persons from
40. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2005); see also Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1359 (9th Cir. 1980).
41. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 626–32
(2002) (discussing a traditional view of the costs, rights, and rewards of patent
ownership and the “exchange of information for protection”). One of the justifications for the patent system is the assumption that intellectual property protections motivate inventors to reveal information to the public that they would
otherwise keep secret. Id. at 625–26.
42. Accent Designs, Inc. v. Jan Jewelry Designs, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 957,
969 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing the false marking statute’s function as a deterrent of competitors’ false marking activity); Bonnie Grant, Deficiencies and
Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Statute: Controlling Use of
the Term ‘Patent Pending’, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 283, 284 –85 (2004) (discussing the functions of putting infringers on notice and allowing the public to
identify the intellectual property status of a product).
43. Oliphant v. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 18 F. Cas. 647, 647 (D. Or.
1878) (No. 10,486).
44. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356–57 (“[T]he act of false marking misleads
the public into believing that a patentee controls the article in question
. . . and increases the cost to the public of ascertaining whether a patentee in
fact controls the intellectual property embodied in an article.”).
45. See Elizabeth I. Winston, The Flawed Nature of the False Marking
Statute, 77 TENN. L. REV. 111, 124 (2009) (“Indicating that an item is patented
when no patent has issued represents the clearest examples of harm to the
public and to the patent system.”); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (discussing how the federal patent laws
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“imposing upon the community by the unauthorized and false
use of the word ‘patent’” was early recognized to be one of the
purposes of the false marking statute.46 It is now “well settled”
that that this protection is one of the purposes of the false
marking statute.47
Marking deters manufacturers from implying that an article is patented when no application has been applied for or received.48 A manufacturer mismarks a product when it labels
the article with an inapplicable patent number.49 The U.S. patent laws were designed to “confer on the authors of useful inventions an exclusive right in their inventions.”50 In order to
maintain the value of this exclusive right, it is necessary to
“protect a patentee against the fraudulent use of his name or
device.”51 To this end, the statute allows the penalization of
those who would “palm off upon the public unpatented articles,
by falsely and fraudulently representing them to have been
patented.”52 Indeed, in almost all patent false marking cases,
the defendant was accused of marking a product with a patent
number that had never applied to the product being sold.53
balance the “tension between the desire to freely exploit” inventions and the
“need to create an incentive” to invent); Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 41–42 (2008) (discussing the costs and benefits of the patent system to society).
46. Oliphant, 18 F. Cas. at 647.
47. Accent Designs, 827 F. Supp. at 969; see also Calderwood v. Mansfield,
71 F. Supp. 480, 482 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (“Obviously the statutory object is to penalize those who would palm off upon the public unpatented articles, by falsely and fraudulently representing them to have been patented.”).
48. See Accent Designs, 827 F. Supp. at 969 (“It is well settled that Section
292 was intended to protect . . . against . . . words imparting that an application for patent had been made when no application had been made or if made,
is not pending.”).
49. See Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352–53 (“[I]n order to establish knowledge
of falsity the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
party accused of false marking did not have a reasonable belief that the articles were properly marked (i.e., covered by a patent).”); Brose v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 768 (5th Cir. 1972) (“[I]f a device claimed to be covered
by license of a cited patent is so obviously not revealed by it as the patentese
world would view it, the use of such a legend would be mismarking.”).
50. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241 (1832).
51. Accent Designs, 827 F. Supp. at 969.
52. Forest Group, Inc., v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) (citing Calderwood, 71 F. Supp. at 482), aff’d in
part and vacated in part, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
53. See, e.g., Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1351–52 (noting that Invitrogen’s
products were not covered by the claims of the patents they were marked with
and never had been).
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Another primary function of marking is to allow the marker to provide notice to potential infringers that the product is
patented. Under 35 U.S.C. § 292(a), a patentee is considered to
have given notice to the public that the product is patented
simply by labeling the article with “the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat.’, together with the number of the patent.”54
Congress incentivized marking by stipulating that marking
serves as notice of infringement and may be used as the basis
for calculating damages against infringers.55
Marking allows the public to identify the product’s intellectual property status. The federal patent statutes were designed
to inform the public and allow competitors and consumers to
determine if a product is patented.56 Marking is meant to provide “a ready means of discerning the status of intellectual
property”57 and to help prevent innocent competitors from becoming infringers.58 When an article is falsely marked as patented it “increases the cost to the public of ascertaining whether a patentee in fact controls the intellectual property embodied
in an article.”59 Thus, by marking an article with a patent
number a manufacturer not only protects its own interests but
also informs and protects the public and its potential competitors.

54. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
55. Id.; see, e.g., Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523,
1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Congress structured . . . [35 U.S.C. § 287] so as to tie
failure to mark with disability to collect damages . . . .”); Motorola, Inc. v.
United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“35 U.S.C. § 287 advises a
patent owner to mark his patented article with a notice of his patent rights.
Failure to do so limits his recovery of damages to the period after the infringer
receives notice of the infringement.”); see also Moore & Nakamura, supra note
26, at 90–91 (discussing the role of marking in a patent holder’s ability to recover from an infringer).
56. Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 397
(1936) (“All these acts reveal the purpose to require that marks be put on patented articles for the information of the public.”).
57. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)).
58. See, e.g., Edward W. Remus & Heather Bjella, Importance of Marking
and Notice of Infringement: An Update, 77 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
107, 108 (2008) (explaining the policy of protecting innocent copiers).
59. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356–57.
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C. CURRENT LITIGATION—EXPIRED PATENTS AND UNPATENTED
ARTICLES
Over its nearly 170 years of history, the false marking statute has been litigated surprisingly little.60 In the cases that
have arisen, the question of what constitutes an “unpatented
article” is a common issue.
In Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., the
Federal Circuit examined whether including expired patents on
the label was a violation of the false marking statute.61 The
court held that the patentee did not violate the false marking
statute because it had no intent to deceive the public.62 It is
noteworthy that the court determined that the errors in marking were “inadvertent, the result of oversight, or caused by patent expirations.”63 Because an intent to deceive is required for
liability under the statute, the Federal Circuit’s grouping of
patent expirations with unintentional acts implied that marking with expired patents, even if intentional, was insufficient to
establish liability under the false marking statute.
The Federal Circuit also addressed how the term “unpatented article” should be determined in Clontech Laboratories,
Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp.64 Clontech accused the patentee, Invitrogen, of marking products with patents even though the
products did not fall within the claims of the patents.65 The
court placed the burden on Clontech to demonstrate the four
elements of false marking: (1) that Invitrogen’s marking imports that the article is patented, (2) that the marking is falsely
affixed to (3) an unpatented article, and (4) that the marking of
the article as patented was done by Invitrogen with the purpose of deceiving the public.66 The court held that Invitrogen
had marked an unpatented article because “the article in question [was] not covered by at least one claim of each patent with
which the article is marked.”67 Moreover, the court also found
unpersuasive Invitrogen’s argument that “there [was] no harm
60. Only thirteen circuit court cases regarding the statute have been decided. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
61. Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124,
1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 1152.
63. Id.
64. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352.
65. Id. at 1351.
66. Id.; see also Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1359 (9th Cir.
1980).
67. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1352.
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in marking products with patents even when those products do
not fall within the bounds of properly construed claims” because the additional marking provides additional information
to potential infringers.68 Nonetheless, the court did not find Invitrogen liable for false marking because Clontech was unable
to demonstrate Invitrogen did not have an “honest good faith
belief in marking its products.”69
Clontech’s definition of an unpatented article as an article
not “covered by at least one claim of each patent with which the
article is marked”70 left open the question of whether a court
should consider an article covered by the claims of expired patents unpatented. A series of cases were filed against defendants
whose products were marked with now-expired patents.71 In
2010, the Federal Circuit was asked to determine specifically if
such an article, covered by the claims of an expired patent, is
an unpatented article for the purposes of the false marking
statute.72 The court held that “an article that is no longer protected by a patent is not ‘patented,’ and is more aptly described
as ‘unpatented.’”73
In Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., a patent attorney sued Solo
on behalf of the United States for false marking.74 Pequignot
alleged that Solo had marked its packages, as well as billions of

68. Id. at 1356.
69. Id. at 1355.
70. Id. at 1352.
71. See, e.g., Brinkmeier v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d
548, 549 (D. Del. 2010) (alleging Graco engaged in false marking by marking
children’s products and its website with expired patents); Stauffer v. Brooks
Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (charging Brooks Brothers with falsely marking its adjustable bow ties by marking them with the
number of a patent that expired more than fifty years ago), rev’d, Nos. 20091428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010);
Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 2, at 5 (asserting that BIC’s labeling
of lighters with the numbers of now-expired patents constitutes false marking); McNEIL Complaint, supra note 2, at 4 –5 (alleging that Tylenol® packaging is falsely marked because of its inclusion of expired patent numbers);
Cumberland Complaint, supra note 2, at 4 –5 (asserting that Sweet’N Low
packaging is falsely marked because of its inclusion of expired patent numbers); Complaint for False Patent Marking at 5, Pequignot v. Gillette Co., No.
08-cv-00049 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2008) (alleging that Gillette marked a variety of
razors, antiperspirants, deodorants, and their packages with expired patent
numbers).
72. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
73. Id. at 1361.
74. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (E.D. Va. 2009),
aff’d in part and vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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lids for hot and cold beverages, with expired patents.75 The
Federal Circuit agreed with Pequignot that “an article covered
by a now-expired patent is ‘unpatented.’”76 The Federal Circuit
cited the district court’s reasoning that “[a]n article that was
once protected by a now-expired patent is no different [from] an
article that has never received protection from a patent. Both
are in the public domain.”77 The Federal Circuit held that the
statute’s language was unambiguous and so it need not consider legislative history.78
Although the Federal Circuit noted that the district court
had stated that when a product is marked with an expired patent number “‘any person with basic knowledge of the patent
system can look up the patent and determine its expiration
date,’”79 the Federal Circuit dismissed this argument because
“determining the expiration date of a patent can, at times, be
difficult.”80 The court held that because the term may be altered by the issue date, term adjustments, and payment of
maintenance feed, marking a patent with an “expired patent
number imposes on the public ‘the cost of determining whether
the involved patents are valid and enforceable.’”81 The Federal
Circuit found that by marking products with expired patent
numbers, Solo had falsely marked.82 Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit held that Solo was not liable for false marking because
Solo had not acted with intent to deceive.83
Since the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Bon Tool and Solo
Cup, the number of false marking cases filed has increased

75. Id.
76. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361.
77. Id. (alteration in original).
78. Id. at 1361–62.
79. Id. at 1362 (quoting Solo Cup, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 798).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347,
1367 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1364 (“[W]e agree with the district court that Solo has provided
sufficient evidence that its purpose was not to deceive the public, and that Pequignot has provided no credible contrary evidence.”). The intent to deceive
the public is part of the four-part test adopted by the Federal Circuit in Clontech. Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1351. Even if the patentee has marked the article
with an inapplicable patent number, it may not be liable for false marking if
the contestant cannot prove its intent to deceive the public by a preponderance
of the evidence. Id. at 1355.
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dramatically.84 Many of these cases were filed not by a competitor or person harmed by the alleged false marking but rather
by people seeking to employ the qui tam provision of the statute by making general allegations that marking after patent
expiration has inhibited competition.85 These plaintiffs have
filed suits against defendants with high volumes of products,
seeking the maximum damages for every product labeled since
expiration of the patent.86 If successful, these plaintiffs would
collect half of these potentially astronomical awards, establishing an incentive for others to file this type of suit,87 providing a
means to damage manufacturers’ reputations,88 and ultimately
creating an incentive for manufacturers not to mark.89
84. See Mary Alice Robbins, TX Marks the Spot: Texas Ranks First in
Number of False-Marking Suits Filed, TEXAS LAW., Aug. 2, 2010, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202464074292 (noting the surge
in false marking suits); Searcey, supra note 2, at A1; Justin Gray, False Marking Case Information, GRAY ON CLAIMS, http://www.grayonclaims.com/false
-marking-case-information/ (last updated Nov. 4, 2010) (compiling a list of the
false marking cases currently filed).
85. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Stauffer’s complaint that alleged an injury to the public
and to the United States because defendant’s conduct had “wrongfully quelled
competition with respect to such bow tie products,” and further alleged defendants had “wrongfully and illegally” advertised patent monopolies that they
did not possess), rev’d, Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL
3397419 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010); Amended Complaint for False Patent Marking, supra note 8, at 5 (alleging that “every person in the United States is a
potential competitor of SOLO CUP” and that the alleged false marking “is
likely to, or at least has the potential to, discourage or deter each person or
company” from competing with Solo Cup). Most of the complaints have been
filed by patent attorneys. See Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 251; Pequignot v.
Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 650 (E.D. Va. 2008).
86. Rupert, supra note 29, at 3; see also, e.g., Amended Complaint for
False Patent Marking, supra note 8, at 10 (alleging that “[e]ach individual lid”
marked with an expired patent number caused harm to the public and was a
separate offense under 35 U.S.C. § 292).
87. David A. Oblon, Expired-Patent Suits Could Be Windfall for Lawyers,
VA. LAW. WEEKLY BLOG (June 22, 2009), http://valawyersweekly.com/blog/2009/
06/22/expired-patent-suits-could-be-windfall-for-lawyers/. Indeed a significant
increase in false marking cases has been seen in the past few months, including more than twenty filed in one two-day period. Dennis Crouch, False Marking False Marking False Marking False Marking All at up to $500 Per Offense,
PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb. 26, 2010, 7:17 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2010/02/false-marking-false-marking-false-marking-false-marking-all-at-up-to-500
-per-offense.html.
88. Oblon, supra note 87.
89. Searcey, supra note 2, at A1 (describing how the increased litigation is
resulting in lawyers advising their clients not to mark their products with patent numbers); see also Ed Green, Protecting Your Company from Patent Marking Bounty Hunters, INTELL. PROP. COUNS., Oct. 2009, at 14.
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II. DEFINING FALSE MARKING
The recent increase in cases brought by third parties to
challenge the marking of articles with expired patent numbers
represents a departure from the traditional implementation of
the false marking statute. This section will contrast how courts
historically have defined false marking and the Federal Circuit’s recent holdings, detail the importance of the qui tam action to the prevention of false marking, and explore the effects
of allowing articles to be marked with expired patent numbers.
This section suggests that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation
of the false marking statute radically changed the statute’s implementation and incentivized false marking litigation, to the
detriment of both manufacturers and the public.
A. THE COURTS’ STRUGGLES TO DEFINE A FALSELY MARKED
PRODUCT
Since the introduction of the false marking statute, a major
aspect of enforcing the statute has been defining what articles
were falsely marked. In one of the first cases to address the
marking of products with expired patent numbers, Wilson v.
Singer Manufacturing Co., an Illinois court was asked to determine if Singer sewing machines labeled with plates stating
the machine was patented violated the false marking statute.90
The plate affixed to each machine was inscribed with the
issue date for each patent that covered the machine, but the
plates continued to be affixed to the sewing machines after all
the patents had expired.91 The court found the offense was not
complete because nothing stamped on the product indicated the
existence of a “subsisting patent” on the machine.92
Similarly, in Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger
& Co., the Federal Circuit failed to explicitly hold that including expired patents on the label violated the false marking statute.93 The court held that the patentee did not violate the false
marking statute because it had no intent to deceive the public.94 However, the court noted that the errors in marking were
“inadvertent, the result of oversight, or caused by patent expi90. Wilson v. Singer Mfg. Co., 12 F. 57, 57–58 (N.D. Ill. 1882).
91. Id. at 58–59.
92. Id.
93. Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124,
1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding instead that there must be a showing that the
false marking or mismarking was “for the purpose of deceiving the public”).
94. Id.

2010]

FALSE MARKING

665

rations.”95 Because an intent to deceive is required for liability
under the statute, the Federal Circuit’s grouping of patent expirations with unintentional acts implied that marking with
expired patents, even if intentional, was insufficient to establish liability under the false marking statute.
In contrast, more recently in Solo Cup, the Federal Circuit
held that the term “unpatented article” includes articles that
fall within the scope of an expired patent.96 The Federal Circuit
cited the Supreme Court’s language in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.: “An article that ‘has been freely exposed to the public . . . stands in the same stead as an item for
which a patent has expired or been denied: it is unpatented and
unpatentable.’”97 In addition, the Federal Circuit rejected Solo’s
arguments based on policy and legislative history, stating that
the “statute is unambiguous.”98 Finally, the Federal Circuit
held that public policy also supported holding that articles
marked with expired patent numbers were falsely marked.99
1. Extension of the Supreme Court’s Use of “Unpatentable”
In deciding Solo Cup, both the district court and the Federal Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s language in Bonito
Boats, noting that once “‘a patent has expired or been denied: it
is unpatented and unpatentable.’”100 There are several reasons
why the Court’s description of an expired patent as “unpatented” should not be extended to the false marking statute. In
Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court’s intent was to prevent a
state from creating patent-like rights for products in addition to
those of the federal patent system, and it did not address
95. Id.
96. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The
district court distinguished Wilson, finding that Singer had made the patents’
status clear by listing the issuance date for each patent on the product, whereas Solo Cup’s marking was insufficient to communicate the patent’s status.
Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 651 (E.D. Va. 2008). At the
time of the Wilson decision, patent term was seventeen years from the issue
date of the patent. Since 1995, patent term is twenty years from the filing date
of the patent. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 24, at 59–60. Thus, under the current Patent Act, even the inclusion of the issue date of the patent would be insufficient to easily communicate the patent’s status.
97. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361 (alteration in original) (quoting Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159 (1989)).
98. Id. at 1361–62.
99. Id. at 1362.
100. Solo Cup, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 652 (quoting Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at
159); see also Pequiqnot, 608 F.3d at 1361.
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whether a product covered by an expired patent should be
marked.101 Moreover, in noting that the “notice requirement is
designed ‘for the information of the public,’” the Court highlighted that the “detailed information concerning the claims of
the patent holder” was “compiled in a central location” during
the application process.102 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized
that one of the functions of patent marking is to direct the public to the patent documentation.103 The Court also stated that
“the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs
and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”104
It would be contradictory if, even after the use of the patent
passes to the public, disclosure of the patent’s existence was
limited.
In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court also reaffirmed that
“after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of
the patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of
federal law,”105 because “on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the
thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.”106 The subject matter covered by the patent cannot be covered by another patent and the monopoly ceases to exist, but
expiration does not mean that the original patent never existed
or the patent no longer describes the invention. Indeed, subsequent patent applications related to the patented invention
that are submitted to the Patent Office are required to reference even expired patents.107 Although expiration causes a patent to become unenforceable, it does not cause the patent to
cease to exist.
The Solo Cup court also failed to recognize that a patent’s
expiration is only part of its status as intellectual property. For
example, a Patent No. XXX imprint does not communicate the
claims of the patent, which aspects of the product or its use are
covered by the patent, or whether there are additional patent
applications or patents that might cover the product. As the
101. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141–42.
102. Id. at 161–62 (quoting Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip.
Co., 297 U.S. 387, 397 (1936)).
103. See id.
104. Id. at 151.
105. Id. at 152.
106. Id. (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)).
107. See Tom Brody, Duty to Disclose: Dayco Products v. Total Containment, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 325 (2008) (emphasizing the
importance of disclosing any known relevant information to the Patent Office).
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Supreme Court recognized in Bonito Boats, one of the functions
of patent marking is to direct the public to the patent documentation where “detailed information concerning the claims of the
patent holder is compiled in a central location.”108
In conclusion, nothing compelled the Federal Circuit to extend the Supreme Court’s dicta in Bonito Boats to the application of the false marking statute. On the contrary, the functions
of patent marking recognized by the Court in Bonito Boats argue against treating an article covered by an expired patent as
unpatented.
2. Statutory Interpretation: The False Marking Statute Is Not
Unambiguous
The Solo Cup court also held that an article covered by an
expired patent should be considered an unpatentable article as
a matter of statutory interpretation.109 The statute, the Federal
Circuit concluded, was “unambiguous.”110 Curiously, the Federal Circuit did not explain why it considered the statutory language unambiguous. The term “patent” may refer to either the
“governmental grant” of the patent rights or to the “official
document” that describes the invention.111 Although the governmental grant of rights has clearly ended after the patent
has expired, the document describing the invention and granting the rights continues to exist. Thus, an article described in
an expired patent, and marked with the number of an expired
patent document, may be viewed as covered by a patent rather
than “unpatented.”
Moreover, this interpretation would not cause invalidated
patents to be considered patented. Although the document issued for an invalid patent still exists, it does not describe an
invention.112 That is, an article described in an invalid patent is
“unpatented” in the sense that no document describing the invention exists or ever existed. In contrast, an article covered by
an unenforceable patent is still exemplified by an official docu108. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 161–62.
109. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
110. Id. at 1362.
111. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (8th ed. 2004); see also, e.g., Kemin
Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales del Centro S.A. de C.V., 301 F. Supp. 2d
970, 974 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (“A patent is a legal document that defines the
metes and bounds of the patentee’s invention.”).
112. A patent may be found invalid if it fails to meet a condition for patentability or does not adequately describe (enable) the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 282
(2002).
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ment describing an invention. In this sense, an article claimed
in an unenforceable patent may still be viewed as covered by a
patent.113 Therefore, an unenforceable patent is much like an
expired patent—it continues to exist but may not be enforced—
and is distinguishable from a cancelled or annulled patent.114
Since the statute is ambiguous and susceptible to more
than one interpretation, the court should have adopted the construction that resulted in a reasonable result consistent with
the legislative purpose.115 As discussed below, treating articles
covered by expired patents as patented is more consistent with
the goals of the legislature’s patent regime.
3. Marking with an Expired Patent Number Does Not
Increase the Burden on the Public
The Solo Cup court also found that requiring the public to
determine the status of an expired patent from a patent number marked on an article “imposes on the public ‘the cost of determining whether the involved patents are valid and enforceable.’”116 The court’s reasoning is in stark contrast to the
reasoning of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in FMC Corp.
v. Control Solutions, Inc.117 The FMC Corp. court held that al113. In fact, many of the same policy arguments for allowing an article to
be marked with an expired patent number can also be made for allowing an
article to be marked with an unenforceable patent number. The patent number continues to direct the public to a source of information about the article,
and it is relatively easy to determine the patent’s status.
114. 69 C.J.S. Patents § 218 (2010) (“The authority to cancel or annul a patent is vested only in the federal courts, and proceedings to cancel or annul a
patent may be maintained only by the United States.”). A patent may be declared unenforceable in a case with a private litigant, but a patent may only be
cancelled in a case brought by the federal government. Id.
115. Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940) (“All statutes must
be construed in the light of their purpose. A literal reading of them which
would lead to absurd results is to be avoided when they can be given a reasonable application consistent with their words and with the legislative purpose.”); see also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 172 (2010) (“[I]f a statute is capable
of being construed in different ways, that construction which works absurd or
unreasonable result should be avoided.”).
116. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347,1367 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
117. 369 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Curiously, the Solo Cup court also found in a later holding that “[w]hen a product is marked with an expired
patent number, any person with basic knowledge of the patent system can
look up the patent and determine its expiration date.” Pequignot v. Solo Cup
Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 798 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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though “the Patent Act imposes a duty to mark products covered by a patent, there is no stated corresponding duty to remove the patent number on a product whose patent has expired.”118 The court also found “no reason” to deny a company
the right to display an expired patent number, finding that the
marking informed “the public of where to acquire the information” needed to practice the invention.119
In addition, a potential competitor or other member of the
public may already be responsible for determining what patents might apply and if they are valid and enforceable. For example, for a competitor interested in making a product, determining the intellectual property landscape is part of the cost of
doing business.120 Because there is no obligation to mark,121
and a patent number may be removed at any time (not just because of expiration), even an unmarked product may be covered
by a valid and enforceable patent. The burden on the public is,
in fact, less if an expired patent number is on a product than if
no patent number is on the product because the number directs
the public to the patent documentation.122
The district court in Solo Cup also concluded that an article covered by an expired patent was “no different than an article that has never received protection from a patent” because
“[b]oth are in the public domain.”123 But a never-patented article is not necessarily found within the public domain, and
there is no obligation to place the invention in the public domain.124 In contrast, one of the inventor’s obligations in filing a
patent is to “disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the
118. FMC Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (citing DONALD S. CHISUM, 7
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[7][c] (2005)).
119. Id. (“This Court finds no reason why FMC may not display its [expired] patent number to inform the public of where to acquire the informational
and teaching quid pro quo that underlies the granting of patent protection.”).
120. See, e.g., Walter C. Linder, Fundamentals of Successful Patent Strategy Development and Administration, in DEVELOPING A PATENT STRATEGY:
LEADING LAWYERS ON COUNSELING CLIENTS ON PATENT PROTECTION,
EVALUATING PATENT PORTFOLIOS, AND WORKING WITH THE USPTO 1, 1
(2010), available at 2010 WL 4460.
121. Cf. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543 (imposing an obligation to
mark).
122. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161–
62 (1989) (discussing the federal patent scheme’s role in providing information
to the public about the status of intellectual property).
123. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 652 (E.D. Va. 2008).
124. Indeed, many unpatented articles in public use are protected by trade
secret rights. Oscar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1685 (2010).
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patent is based.”125 A patentee—even the owner of an expired
patent—has disclosed his invention to the public. Even after a
patent expires, an article continues to be described by the patent claims126 and referred to by its patent number, and both the
patent and its status may be easily discovered by searching for
the patent number found on the marked article. An article covered by an expired patent is, therefore, not unpatented in the
same sense as an article that has never been covered by a patent.
B. QUI TAM ACTIONS AS A MEANS TO PREVENT FALSE MARKING
In addition to determining whether an article has been
falsely marked, a court must also determine whether the party
that is bringing the action has the standing to contest the
marker’s actions. The number of parties that may bring such
an action is significantly increased by the false marking statute’s qui tam status. The increased number of potential plaintiffs decreases the burden on the government to enforce proper
marking.127
Nevertheless, in order for a plaintiff to properly bring a qui
tam action under the false marking statute, the false marking
must have caused an injury to the government or the public.128
Yet, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the marking of
an article with an expired patent would result in an injury to
the public or the government.129 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held in Stauffer v. Brooks Brothers, Inc. that almost any

125. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Bonito
Boats, 489 U.S. at 150 (“The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right
to practice the invention for a period of years.”).
126. Cf. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (establishing the Federal Circuit’s test that an article must be “covered by at least one claim of each patent with which the article is marked”).
127. Winston, supra note 45, at 117.
128. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (“Section 292 thus assigns . . . to ‘any person’ . . . the authority to bring
suit to vindicate cognizable injuries incurred on the public or the United States
through violation of its provisions.” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006))), rev’d,
Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed Cir. Aug. 31,
2010).
129. It is easier to imagine a situation where a single potential competitor
might be injured, but it is difficult to believe that every potential competitor
would fail to ascertain the status of the patent.
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plaintiff has standing to sue because “a violation of that statute
inherently constitutes an injury to the United States.”130
Stauffer sued Brooks Brothers for false marking of adjustable men’s bow ties because Brooks Brothers continued to mark
the bow ties with patent numbers that expired in 1954 and
1955.131 Stauffer alleged that Brooks Brothers injured the public because the false marking “misleads and wrongly imposes
the costs of evaluating patents on the public”132 and “‘wrongfully quelled competition with respect to . . . bow tie products
thereby causing harm to the economy of the United States.’”133
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court and concluded
that Stauffer’s standing arose “from his status as ‘any person’”;
that Stauffer had “sufficiently alleged” an injury to the United
States, caused by Brooks Brothers’s alleged conduct; and the
injury was likely to be cured by a favorable decision.134 The
case was remanded to the district court.135
District courts have reached different decisions on the issue of standing. Some courts have held, as the Federal Circuit
did, that “a violation to the statute inherently constitutes an injury to the United States.”136 However, other courts, including
the district court in Stauffer, have ruled that the defendant’s
competitors were not deterred by the marking with the expired
patent137 and therefore competition had not been “quelled” sufficiently to result in harm to the economy of the United

130. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453,
2010 WL 3397419, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010).
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id. (quoting Complaint at 38, Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d 248) (No. 08cv-10369)).
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *4; see also Shizzle Pop, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No. CV 10-3491
PA (FFMx), 2010 WL 3063066, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010) (holding that
the plaintiff had standing); Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714,
728 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff had standing even though the
only injury to the United States could only be to “its sovereignty”), aff’d in part
and vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
137. Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 255. The district court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife that in order to have
standing a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete, particularized, “actual or
imminent” injury “so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no
injury would have occurred at all.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 564 (1992).
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States.138 Indeed, in Stauffer, the competitors received their
bow ties from the same supplier, and their products were identically marked.139 Therefore, it is almost impossible to imagine
how any real injury was suffered by the public or the United
States.
In contrast to marking with inapplicable patent numbers,
it is difficult to imagine how marking products with accurate,
now-expired patent numbers “inherently constitutes an injury
to the United States.”140 Indeed, continuing to mark an article
allows the public and competitors to quickly determine the patented status of the product and how to copy it.141 The number
of parties that may bring an action under the false marking
statute is already large because the false marking statute’s qui
tam status and the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation. Continuing to interpret the statute to include articles covered by
expired patents makes the statute’s reach inappropriately
broad.
C. THE ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF CONTINUING TO ALLOW
ARTICLES COVERED BY EXPIRED PATENTS TO BE MARKED
The increasing amount of false marking litigation has focused attention on the effects of allowing an article to be
marked with an expired patent number. As noted above, marking with an expired patent number does not increase the burden on the public and may, in fact, make it easier for competitors to conduct patentability or marketability analyses.142
138. Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 255; see also United States ex rel. FLFMC,
LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No. 10cv0435, 2010 WL 3156162, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
3, 2010) (holding that a noncompetitor plaintiff lacked standing).
139. Stauffer, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
140. Stauffer, 2010 WL 3397419, at *4.
141. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 798 (E.D. Va.
2009) (“[M]arking an article with an expired patent can work to the marker’s
detriment, because public patent documents reveal all of the previously patented design features that are now in the public domain, thus creating a road
map for anyone wishing to legally copy the product.”), aff’d in part and vacated
in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Searcey, supra note 2, at A1
(describing how “it can be relatively simple” to determine if patent numbers on
products are outdated “because patents are numbered chronologically”).
142. FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 539, 584 (E.D.
Pa. 2005) (“This Court finds no reason why FMC may not display its [expired]
patent number to inform the public of where to acquire the informational and
teaching quid pro quo that underlies the granting of patent protection.”); see
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2126 (8th. ed., rev. 8, 2010) (assuming the general availability of
patents as prior art for the purposes of the USPTO).
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In addition, extending the term “unpatented article” to
cover items once protected by a valid patent has already
created a new litigation threat with “potentially devastating
consequences.”143 A large number of these types of cases have
already been filed, and the damages being demanded are in the
billions of dollars.144
Including articles covered by expired patents in the definition of “unpatented article” is also creating an incentive not to
mark.145 In fact, 35 U.S.C. § 287 creates in a patent holder an
“obligation to mark its product consistently and continuously in
order to provide constructive notice of the patent.”146 Congress
designed § 287 so that a patentee can only recover damages for
infringing sales that occurred after it gave notice of its patent
rights147 in order to “encourage the patentee to give notice to
the public of the patent.”148 Because a manufacturer is required
to mark a product to satisfy the notice requirements of § 287, a
manufacturer must balance the danger of being sued for inaccurately marking with having the ability to sue for infringement.149 The continued prospect of potential litigation created
by extending the false marking statute to cover articles protected by now-expired patents will quickly spoil the incentive to

143. Remus & Bjella, supra note 58, at 110 (noting the potential for
“enormous damage awards”); Oblon, supra note 87 (theorizing that damages
could run “into [the] billions of dollars”); Brian C. Riopelle & Steven D. Hamilton, False Marking Claims for Products Stamped with Expired Patents, Legal
Updates, MCGUIREWOODS (June 16, 2009), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/
news-resources/item.asp?item=4051; see also Searcey, supra note 2, at A1 (noting that such findings could result in extreme damage awards).
144. Gene Quinn, Apple and Others Sued for $60 Billion+ for False Patent
Marking, IP WATCHDOG (July 31, 2010, 1:51 PM), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/
07/31/apple-sued-false-patent-marking/id=11858/. The plaintiff in these suits,
Americans for Fair Patent Use, is an LLC formed by an intellectual property
boutique in Austin, Texas. Robbins, supra note 84.
145. See, e.g., Searcey, supra note 2, at A1 (noting that increased litigation
has resulted in at least one attorney advising his clients not to mark, even
though that means the clients cannot seek damages for infringement).
146. Forest Group, Inc., v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008), aff’ d in part and vacated in part, 590 F.3d
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
147. Id.
148. Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
149. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 834 –45 (2002) (discussing the rights, benefits, and pitfalls of patent marking to the marker and its
competitor).
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mark created by § 287, resulting in a decreased incidence of
marking.150
Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that a patentee who
innocently marks a product with an expired patent will be protected from the costs of litigation by the intent requirement of
the false marking statute.151 Although the intent requirement
may protect the patentee from a court’s imposition of liability,
discovery and litigation may stretch for months or even
years,152 at considerable cost to the marking company.
Excluding articles marked with expired patent numbers
from the meaning of unpatented article is necessary to prevent
additional litigation against patent owners who innocently
mark products with expired patent numbers, to prevent the development of incentives not to mark, and to create the national
uniformity that the patent system relies on.153
III. EXCLUDING PRODUCTS COVERED BY EXPIRED
PATENTS FROM THE MEANING OF “UNPATENTED
ARTICLE”
Third parties’ attempts to profit from the qui tam provision
in the false marking statute by challenging products labeled
with expired patents is developing into a huge liability for
manufacturers. Yet patentees rely on the notice function of patent marking to protect them from infringers and to provide notice in infringement suits. In order to promote the notice functions of marking and to ensure the proper use of the informer
action, the Federal Circuit should reverse its recent holding to
exclude products covered by expired patents from the meaning
of “unpatented article.” Alternatively, Congress should amend

150. See, e.g., Oblon, supra note 87; Riopelle & Hamilton, supra note 143.
151. A requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 292(a), is that the marker must have affixed the patent number with the “purpose of deceiving the public.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 292(a) (2006).
152. See, e.g., Arcadia Mach. & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d
1124, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Arcadia had totally failed, after at least nine
months of discovery, to produce any evidence of intent to deceive the public.”).
The litigation in Solo Cup lasted over a year before the court found that there
was “not a scintilla of evidence that Solo ever . . . manifested any actual deceptive intent.” Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799 (E.D. Va.
2009), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
153. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162
(1989) (“One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright
Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of
intellectual property.”).
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the false marking statute and protect the informer action by
explicitly excluding expired patents from the statute’s coverage.
A. PRECEDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR ONCE PATENTED IS ALWAYS
PATENTED
Articles covered by once-valid-but-now-expired patents and
marked with the numbers of those expired patents should not
be considered unpatented articles for the purposes of the false
marking statute. Legislative history and judicial precedent—
until the Federal Circuit’s recent holdings—support the conclusion that an article once patented is always patented.
Congress initially established the false marking statute to
prevent a person from marking as patented “any thing . . . [for]
which he hath not or shall not have obtained letters patent.”154
Nothing in this language suggests that lawmakers meant the
statute to be extended to cover articles for which a patent was
obtained but has now expired. Moreover, nothing in the revisions to the statute or the legislative history implies that Congress intended to expand the statute to cover anything other
than articles that have never been patented.155
Treating articles covered by the claim of an expired patent
as patented articles is consistent with the interpretation of the
false marking statute in prior case law. For example, in Wilson
v. Singer Manufacturing Co., an Illinois court held that Singer
had not violated the false marking statute by labeling its sewing machines with plates stating that the machine was patented, even though the patents had expired.156 Similarly, in Arcadia Machine & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., the Federal
Circuit held that the patentee, Ruger, did not violate the false
marking statute even though it had included expired patents

154. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544 (1842).
155. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2403 (describing § 292 as being minimally revised but maintaining it
such that it relates “to falsely marking an article as being patented when it
was not patented, which is now the present law”); cf. Patent Reform Act of
2010, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 146(k)(1) (2010) (restricting plaintiffs to those who
can show that they have suffered a competitive injury). If passed, this legislation would effectively eliminate the entire group of plaintiffs seeking to enforce
the false marking statute against those marking articles with expired patent
numbers. Joshua M. Dalton & Deana El-Mallawany, Recent Wave of False
Marking Lawsuits Highlights Need to Monitor Patent Marking Practices,
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.bingham.com/Media
.aspx?MediaID=10466.
156. Wilson v. Singer Mfg. Co., 12 F. 57, 58–59 (N.D. Ill. 1882).
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on its products’ labels.157 In Clontech Laboratories, Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., the Federal Circuit held that “unpatented article”
means that “the article in question is not covered by at least
one claim of each patent with which the article is marked.”158
Even after a valid patent expires, the claims of a patent continue to read on the article. Furthermore, even though the subject
of the patent passes into the public domain, the subject matter
remains described and exemplified in the patent claims.159
Thus, there exists a statutory interpretation whereby articles
covered by an expired patent are still patented. Holding that
articles covered by expired patents are not “unpatented articles” would be consistent with this judicial precedent. In addition to legislative and judicial precedent, public policy strongly
supports a holding that once patented is always patented.
B. POLICY SUPPORT FOR ONCE PATENTED IS ALWAYS PATENTED
Considering an article covered by an expired patent as patented is consistent with the purposes of the false marking statute. Marking products as patented helps direct the public to the
patent documentation where “detailed information concerning
the claims of the patent holder is compiled in a central location.”160 Allowing products covered by the claims of a patent to
be marked with that patent number facilitates this public notice function of patents.
Moreover, marking with an expired patent number does
not destroy the public notice function of marking. Some have
suggested that the public and competitors alike interpret a patent number as being evidence of an enforceable—not expired—
patent.161 However, unlike a product that has never been pat157. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, 786 F.2d at 1125.
158. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
159. Compare Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 152 (1989) (“[O]n the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent
becomes public property.” (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S.
169, 185 (1896))), with id. at 151 (“[T]he ultimate goal of the patent system is
to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”). Indeed, many infringement suits continue to be litigated long after the
patent has expired, and the information contained within those claims continues to act as prior art for the purposes of future patents. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (2006); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 142, § 706.02(a).
160. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 161–62.
161. E.g., Amended Complaint for False Patent Marking, supra note 8, at
4; see also Grant, supra note 42, at 283 (“There are two harmful effects.
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ented, a product covered by an expired patent still possesses
the features that caused it to be patentable.162 A consumer is
not deceived as to the article’s fitness for patenting when it is
marked with an expired patent number.163 The “character and
value of the article” do not change when a patent expires.164
Commentators have also argued that the public assumes that
an article marked with a patent number is more valuable.165 In
fact, an article’s fitness for patenting can bear little relation to
its commercial value or usefulness because an invention may
meet the utility requirement even when it is not superior to the
prior art.166
Moreover, marking with the patent number—even if it is
expired—permits the public to determine the patents that apply to the article, locate them, and determine their status.167
For most patents, it is possible for anyone with experience with
patents to determine if a patent has expired and entered the
public domain.168 Being able to locate the applicable patents
. . . First, incorrect marking may deter scientific research when an inventor
sees a mark and decides to forgo continued research to avoid an infringement
action. Second, incorrect marking may deceive consumers and harm the industry when the public purchases products based on the mark.”); Winston, supra
note 45, at 127–28 (noting that because the patent issue date is no longer required to be marked, harm results to the public because they must now research every patent to see if it is currently valid).
162. See Oliphant v. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 18 F. Cas. 647, 647–48 (D.
Or. 1878) (No. 10,486) (“[T]he word ‘patent’ upon an article is prima facie an
assertion that it has some peculiar value or merit . . . . The impression which
the fact ordinarily makes upon the mind is, that the article marked ‘patent’ is
in some respects more useful or desirable than articles of the same general
kind or use which are not so marked.”).
163. See id. (noting that only if an item is originally patentable will a patent be granted).
164. See id. at 648 (“If, then, a person marks an unpatented article with
the word ‘patent,’ the public are thereby liable to be deceived as to the character and value of the article.”).
165. See, e.g., id. at 647–48 (noting that an item marked with the word “patent” denotes a value that is perceived by the public to be more valuable in
some respects than an item which does not contain the word); Grant, supra
note 42, at 289 (“The existence of a patent could cause a consumer to believe
that the product is of superior quality to other products on the market without
a patent mark . . . .”).
166. 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 145 (2010).
167. See Ameet Sachdev, Manufacturers Face Patent-Suit Headaches: Recent Ruling Raises Potential Bounty for Consumers Alleging ‘False Marks’ on
Goods, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 2010, at C17, available at 2010 WLNR 4329031
(“[I]t takes only a matter of minutes to determine whether a patent has run
out . . . .”).
168. Cf. Solo Cup Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 9 (arguing that Solo’s
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may even be an advantage to a competitor.169 First, marking
can direct competitors to the enabling disclosure contained in
the patent application.170 Second, a careful manufacturer
searches the prior art for applicable patents during development in order to prevent infringement.171 There is much to
suggest that the public and competitors should not rely on patent marking alone to determine a product’s intellectual property status.172 Nevertheless, when a product is marked with relevant patents, a searcher will be able to determine more easily
what the patents cover, their status, and their relationship to
other potentially applicable patents.173 Thus, marking an article with an expired patent number does not destroy the public
notice function but may even provide additional information
and advantages to the public and potential competitors. By ensuring that articles covered by an expired patent are considered
patented articles for the purposes of the false marking statute,
ongoing marking will be encouraged, bolstering the public notice function of the statute.
Holding that articles covered by the claims of expired patents are patented will also generate ancillary benefits. These
benefits include allowing the patentee or marker of the product
to provide useful information without imposing an undue burden on the public; preventing the development of incentives not
to mark; averting exploitative litigation such as Solo Cup; and
limiting the enforcement of the false marking statute to violations that have the potential to cause serious harm to the public. In contrast, treating articles covered by the claims of expired patents will encourage an astonishing amount of
mark provided an easy way for a potential competitor to determine the status
of the patent).
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 120, at *1 (“Virtually any business involved in the development, manufacture, or distribution of products, services,
or information will benefit from a patent and intellectual property strategy.”).
172. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 42, passim (explaining that proper marking is not mandatory nor does it apply to pending patent applications); John
LaBarre & Xavier Gómez-Velasco, Ready, Set, Mark Your Patented Software!,
RICHMOND J.L. & TECH., 6 (Fall 2005), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v12i1/article3
.pdf (explaining that there is no marking requirement if the patent covers a
process).
173. See Neil S. Hirshman & Rashmi Chandra, Intellectual Property Due
Diligence Methodology, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD
COMPANY 2001, at 9, 11 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No.
B0-00Z0, 2001) (describing an analysis of a patent portfolio).
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exploitative litigation.174 Lawsuits such as Solo Cup are being
brought by patent-marking trolls—individuals who do not own
patents, but who look for high-volume products that might result in large penalty recoveries.175 Yet, the holding in Solo Cup
resulted in the formation of companies simply to file these cases.176 The attempts by these plaintiffs to use the false marking
statute to extract “significant amounts of money from companies”177 are contrary to the purposes of the qui tam aspect of
the false marking statute.
The informer aspect of the false marking statute is intended to offers rewards “to accomplish outlawing of fraudulent
and illegal acts to the public detriment,”178 not as a moneymaking scheme for private parties. Where false marking of an
article does create “an actual or imminent injury in fact to
competition, to the United States economy, or the public,”179 the
false marking statute provides a valuable enforcement provision. However, allowing this action to be misused by patent
trolls weakens the false marking statute and creates needlessly
costly litigation.

174. See Susan Decker, Firms Fight Outbreak of Patent Lawsuits: Pfizer,
P&G Accused of Falsely Marking Items, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 28,
2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 4222330 (describing the “explosion” in the
number of patent false marking cases filed after the Federal Circuit’s recent
decision that a manufacturer “may face a penalty of up to $500 for every item
that’s falsely marked”).
175. Rupert, supra note 29, at 3 (“[A] ‘troll’ is [sic] pejorative term describing a non-manufacturing patent owner who owns one or more patents and asserts the patent(s) against alleged infringers, with a desire typically to obtain
settlement rather than actually trying any lawsuit.”); see also Matthew Marquardt, A New Breed of Patent Troll? False Patent Marking in the US,
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g =
b20b6e5f-d408-4364 -9cc4 -ab648bb8d70c (referring to these plaintiffs as
“marking trolls”); Erik Sherman, Trolls Target Patent Marking with a Trillion
Dollar Lawsuit, BNET (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/technology
-business/trolls-target-patent-markings-with-a-trillion-dollar-lawsuit/2723 (discussing the new type of patent troll).
176. Robbins, supra note 84 (describing the formation of Americans for Fair
Patent Use by an intellectual property boutique and the Patent Compliance
Group by an attorney). These companies, formed for the purpose of filing false
marking suits, have filed dozens of suits in 2010. See McDonnell, Boehnen,
Hulbert & Berghoff, LLP, supra note 2 (listing recent false marking suits filed
across the country).
177. Rupert, supra note 29, at 4.
178. Calderwood v. Mansfield, 71 F. Supp. 480, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
179. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), rev’d, Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 31, 2010).
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C. A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE FALSE MARKING
STATUTE
The Federal Circuit’s decision that an “offense” in 35
U.S.C. § 292 should be defined on a per article basis180 firmly
established a financial motivation for plaintiffs to sue under
the qui tam provision of the false marking statute. The ruling
in Solo Cup that an article covered by an expired patent is an
unpatented article181 overly broadened the false marking cause
of action. Either Congress or the Federal Circuit should act to
limit the qui tam provision and arrest the current trend towards exploitative litigation.
The Federal Circuit is uniquely positioned to prevent further additional litigation by explicitly holding that articles covered by expired patents are not “unpatented articles” for the
purposes of the false marking statute. Failure by the Federal
Circuit to act is likely to induce extensive legislative restrictions on this qui tam action, potentially resulting in the loss of
a mechanism to enforce the proper use of a patent marking.182
Nevertheless, if the Federal Circuit fails to act, Congress
should take decisive action to protect the informer action by
amending the false marking statute to clarify that it excludes
articles covered by expired patents. This conservative interpretation of the statute by the Federal Circuit or Congress would
restrict the enforcement of the false marking statute to violations that have the potential to cause serious harm to the public and would preserve incentives to mark.
CONCLUSION
The recent spate of litigation by third parties using the
false marking statute against the makers of articles covered by
expired patents presents a significant financial risk for patentees. If this litigation is allowed to continue, it will create incentives for manufacturers not to mark their products, contravening the public notice function of the patent act. The Federal
Circuit or Congress should act to prevent labeling articles covered by valid but now-expired patents from being false mark180. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
181. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
182. All but two other American qui tam actions have been repealed. See
DOYLE, supra note 30, at 4. Proposed legislation would entirely remove the qui
tam action from § 292. See Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong.
§ 146(k)(1) (2010) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) to require competitive injury
for a plaintiff to bring suit); see also Brown & Jones, supra note 37.
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ing. This exclusion is consistent with legislative and judicial
precedent as well as public and patent policy. In addition, this
limitation will prevent the development of incentives not to
mark and avert exploitative litigation.

